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Two districts with divergent productivity levels engage in policy-making
on the provision of local public goods that enhance future income and hence
create a dynamic linkage across periods. The policy choices of district rep-
resentatives are derived under alternative ﬁscal systems, and the problem of
system selection is examined. It is shown that a decentralized system is more
likely to be selected in a more equal society. On the other hand, when a great
deal of beneﬁt spills over from a local public good, or when policy makers
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11 Introduction
There is a rich literature exploring how best to provide local public goods. The pio-
neering work of Oates (1972) established a standard informal method for analyzing
such problems. Oates’ Decentralization Theorem states that in the face of het-
erogeneous regional preferences, local governments can attain greater eﬃciency by
setting the level of public goods individually than can a central government by pro-
viding a uniform level of public goods. This theorem holds “for a public good—the
consumption of which is deﬁned over geographical subsets of the total population”
(p. 35). Indeed, Oates argues that if the optimal-sized locality to internalize all the
beneﬁts and costs associated with a particular public good cannot be determined,
loss of welfare will result. It is now well understood that independent local govern-
ments, which represent the interests of citizens in their jurisdiction, generally fail
to provide the optimal level of local public goods that will internalize spillovers into
other regions; this implies that the central government is expected to correct the
problem.1
Many studies have been based on Oates’ arguments. Besley and Coate (2003),
in a static framework, deduce that higher interregional spillovers will make a cen-
tralized system more eﬃcient in that aggregate surplus is maximized. Without
spillovers, on the other hand, a decentralized system will be more eﬃcient. These
theoretical results support Oates’ Decentralization Theorem. Lockwood (2002) con-
tinues this line of inquiry by analyzing alternative legislative decision-making rules
and the ﬁscal regime selected. The present study shares a similar motivation, but
analyzes district productivity as the principal indicator of interregional heterogene-
ity. We explore a causal relationship between productivity disparities and the ﬁscal
regime selected in a dynamic framework, and ﬁnd results that qualitatively diﬀer
from previous studies.
1See, e.g., Wildasin (1986) and Wellisch (2000), who provide comprehensive surveys on the
beneﬁts and problems of decentralization.
2The aim of this study is to evaluate the relative merits of decentralization and
centralization. In a decentralized system, a government in each district individually
sets a tax rate on income to ﬁnance public expenditure on the local public good. In
a centralized system, the central government, which comprises delegates from the
districts, sets a uniform tax rate and provides a uniform level of local public goods
across the districts. The centralized system, although costly, enables districts to
share funds, and is further expected to implement a cooperative solution that can
maximize the welfare of the entire society.
Suppose that there are two districts that diﬀer from each other in their pro-
ductivity. A local public good supplied in any period enhances the next-period
income of citizens in the home district, and also raises the next-period income of
citizens in the neighboring district provided that it generates interregional beneﬁt
spillovers. A local public good in a district also has indirect eﬀects on the income
of future citizens in this district. The increase in the next-period income in the
home or neighboring district inﬂuences the local public good level in that period,
which in turn inﬂuences income in the following period. This dynamic linkage will
expand indeﬁnitely. These eﬀects of a given district’s local public good provision
upon its future citizens are referred to as intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers.W e
ﬁrst examine policy choice under alternative ﬁscal regimes when representatives
are shortsighted and care only about the eﬀects of their decisions on their citizens’
income in the next period. The policy choices derived from this model analysis are
in line with the current literature. We then extend the representatives’ horizon and
show that a tax rate chosen by representatives with longer sight is higher, since
they internalize intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers into the farther future.
The choice between the two ﬁscal systems is examined on the basis of the ex-
pected policy decisions by shortsighted representatives. Our main result is to an-
alytically predict that unanimous consent for a decentralized (centralized) ﬁscal
regime is more often observed in societies with a smaller (larger) productivity dis-
3parity and a lower (higher) degree of interregional beneﬁt spillovers. When a great
deal of beneﬁt spills over from a local public good, ﬁnancially supporting a low-
productivity district is also beneﬁcial to a high-productivity district. In contrast,
with a low degree of beneﬁt spillovers, a high-productivity district is unwilling to in-
vest in a low-productivity district. Moreover, the low-productivity district loses less
by decentralization if interregional divergence is small. It is well documented both
theoretically and empirically that decentralization (centralization) is promoted by
higher (lower) income levels,2 but no previous analysis has shown a theoretical link
between interregional disparities in productivity and the choice of ﬁscal regime.3 It
is important to focus on disparity in studying the political decision-making process
in the presence of conﬂicting interests.
This model further shows a link between representatives’ time horizon and the
system selected. When policy makers consider future generations, decentralization
may be preferred over centralization, even with complete interregional spillovers.
Each farsighted policy maker allows for the long-term beneﬁts of increasing income
in the other district, even under a decentralized system, which suppresses the usual
welfare loss resulting from decentralization. Farsighted policy choice is thus a partial
solution to interregional externality problems.4 In other words, when each policy-
2For instance, see Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). These authors construct
theoretical models and demonstrate empirically the negative correlation between per capita income
and centralization.
3Among the empirical works, Greene (1985) and Hayashi and Sato (2005) demonstrate the neg-
ative eﬀects of income inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient on decentralization. Greene
(1985) also considers the range of median family income across regions as a measure of interre-
gional income disparity and obtains its estimated negative coeﬃcient. In contrast, Pommerehne’s
(1977) empirical analysis reveals an inverse relation between interregional income disparity and
centralization. He points out, however, that the sample size is too small to regard this result “as
safely established” (p. 305).
4Wellisch and Richter (1995) show theoretically that decentralization induces internalization of
intergenerational pollution externalities, since the future adverse environment causing emigration
of residents is capitalized into the current property price, which is the concern of the current local
4maker is expected to make a decision when caring only about its immediate eﬀects,
an institution to promote policy coordination among districts will be established.
These results therefore predict progress towards decentralization in an environment
with ﬁscal equalization policies and foresighted politicians.
A number of researchers have discussed whether decision-making on public ex-
penditure should be centralized or decentralized. Models closely related to ours can
be divided into three strands. The most closely related consider which system is
superior in solving the problems of interregional externalities, including Lockwood
(2002) and Besley and Coate (2003), as mentioned, as well as Ellingsen (1998),
Schwager (1999), Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005), and Rubinchik-Pessach (2005).5
There is also a series of papers that, employing the standard capital tax competition
framework, analyze the optimal design of a ﬁscal system (see, for example, Bucov-
etsky, Marchand, and Pestieau, 1998; Brueckner, 2004; Wilson and Janeba, 2005).
In models belonging to these two strands, however, public goods directly aﬀect
citizens’ utility, and diﬀerent preferences for public goods are stated as the reason
for heterogeneity among districts, whereas the present model assumes that districts
have the same preferences for public goods: districts diﬀer only in productivity, and
public goods serve as public inputs.
Finally, the present model contributes to the development of dynamic models
incorporating public expenditure. Oates (1993) mentions the possibility of a de-
centralized system to facilitate economic development that tailors public projects
to suit local needs. B´ enabou (1996) and Brueckner (2006) examine the relation
between systems and economic growth by considering investment in human capital
agency. Their model is, however, based on the assumption of no interregional spillovers to leave
future generations a place to escape.
5In spite of their diﬀerent motivations, the study of Bolton and Roland (1997) should be
mentioned because they also examine ﬁscal regime design in a two-district model. They describe
interregional conﬂicts over redistribution policies and the resulting breakup of the nation in a
static framework.
5as the engine driving growth. Nishimura (2006) focuses on the relationship between
complementarity in local public good provision and economic growth under alter-
native systems. The studies of Besley and Coate (1998) and Battaglini and Coate
(2005) are similar to the present one in that beneﬁts from public goods directly
produce a dynamic linkage, but they do not consider ﬁscal decentralization. The
recent study of Kempf and Rossignol (2005), which extends endogenous growth
models with the public input of Barro (1990) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994), also
uses a two-district model with heterogeneous income. Although they consider the
problem of integration, they do not describe interregional beneﬁt spillovers or the
explicit linkage between disparity and system design.
In Section 2, formal deﬁnitions of each ﬁscal system and citizen preferences are
set out. In Section 3, policy choices by shortsighted representatives are derived for
each ﬁscal regime, and then the choice of ﬁscal regime is considered for any pair
of productivity disparity and the degree of interregional beneﬁt spillovers. Section
4 extends the horizon of representatives and examines the relationship between
their consideration of future generations and system design. Section 5 presents
conclusions. Technical details are set out in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Policy Choice
We deﬁne a decentralized ﬁscal regime as a system in which all decisions on ﬁ-
nancing and supplying local public goods are made by local governments. Under a
centralized ﬁscal regime, these decisions are made by a central government compris-
ing delegates from all districts that is supposed to impose a uniform tax rate and to
provide the same level of local public goods across districts. Below, the superscripts
d and c stand for decentralization and centralization.
There are two geographically distinct districts, denoted A and B. Each district
6has a continuum of citizens with a population of one. We suppose immobility of
citizens across districts. The population of a given district i ∈{ A,B} is internally
homogeneous, so that each citizen has an identical level of income. Let xi denote
a constant and district-speciﬁc level of productivity, which is heterogeneous across
districts. The level of productivity is determined by geographic and historical fac-
tors of the district, e.g., whether the district is convenient for transportation and
rich in natural resources; whether it is politically stable; and whether it has well-
functioning economic and political institutional structures. Suppose without loss of
generality that 0 <x A <x B, so that 1 <
xB
xA < ∞.
Citizens’ real income in a given period depends on their productivity level, as
well as the levels of local public goods supplied in both districts during the previous
period:
yis = xiΔis, (1)
where yis denotes the real income of citizens in district i and period s; the factor






where gi,s−1 and gj,s−1 denote the levels of local public goods supplied in districts i
and j during period s−1. In this model, gi,s−1 and gj,s−1 are therefore public inputs
that enhance real income in the next period s. The positive-valued parameter α
is a measure of the degree of beneﬁt produced by the home public input, and the
parameter γ ∈ [0,1] indicates the extent of beneﬁt spillovers, i.e., how it aﬀects
real income in the neighboring district in comparison with the home district. If
γ = 0, then each local public good produces no beneﬁt spillovers to the neighboring
district, whereas if γ = 1, the beneﬁt of one district’s public good spills over com-
pletely. In the context of this model, districts are deﬁned as local entities organized
by a national government if a centralized system is executed. Local public goods
generating interregional beneﬁt spillovers include investments in infrastructure, ed-
7ucation, and preservation of the environment. We could equally well interpret each
district as a nation and the centralized government as an international institution,
provided it can control the provision of global public goods in each nation. In
this context, public goods might include peace and security, research, economic
development and stabilization, as well as those cited above.6
Assumption 1.0<α<1
2.
Assumption 2.Δ A0 =Δ B0 =Δ 0.
Assumption 1 ensures that Δis converges to a steady-state level, and allows us to
compare citizen welfare under alternative ﬁscal regimes. Assumption 2 provides us
with initial conditions. The transitional dynamics of Δis and its steady-state level
under Assumptions 1 and 2 are detailed in Appendix A.1 using policy outcomes
derived in Sections 3 and 4.
The real consumption of citizens in district i and period s is given by:
cis = yis(1 − τ
r
is), (3)
where r ∈{ d,c} is the choice of ﬁscal regime, and τr
is denotes the proportional
tax rate imposed on income under each regime. Let the utility of every citizen in
district i in period s be given by:
uis = logcis − λ
r, (4)
where λr (λd =0<λ c) is a measure of each district’s disadvantage on losing auton-
omy. It may capture the eﬀects of sociological factors that likely prompt preferences
for political independence, such as ethno-linguistic or religious fragmentation in the
society.7
6Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) study the role of international unions in resolving the
problems of externalities arising from such public goods.
7Easterly and Levine (1997), Poterba (1997), and Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) ﬁnd
8In every period s, a representative, drawn randomly from the homogeneous
citizenry in each district i, sets a tax rate τr
is either individually or collectively
according to ﬁscal regime r. In choosing τr
is, the representative counts the utility of
all citizens who reside or will reside in his district through period s+T,1≤ T<∞.

















where δ ∈ (0,1) denotes a discount factor common to all citizens.
2.2 Choice of Fiscal Regime
Suppose that, at the beginning of period 0 and prior to the representatives’ policy
decision, districts collectively choose one of the two systems. We denote the steady-
state level of Δis under regime r by Δr
i. At this design stage, the welfare of district
i under ﬁscal regime r is measured by the steady-state level of period utility, which
is derived from (1), (3), and (4) as:
W
r
i = logxi + logΔ
r
i + log(1 − τ
r) − λ
r. (6)
We demonstrate in the subsequent sections that a tax rate chosen at each policy
decision stage is uniform across regions and periods, i.e., τr
is = τr holds for each
r. Formulation (6) implies that these policy outcomes are expected at the system
selection stage.
To determine which system is selected, we rely on the Pareto criterion for binary
choice, which is also used in Lockwood’s (2002) argument.
evidence showing that ethno-linguistic division is a signiﬁcant cause of conﬂicts over public good
policies. Panizza (1999) ﬁnds that ethno-linguistic division in a country is negatively correlated
with the degree of its ﬁscal centralization. In contrast, Arzaghi and Henderson (2005) show that
ethno-linguistic diversity is positively related to ﬁscal centralization. They mention as a reason
that “diverse countries may choose to remain de facto centralized as a strong-arm way of avoiding
a complete split of the country into two (or more)” (p. 1181).
9Deﬁnition 1. System r is Pareto-preferred over system r  if and only if, without
any side payment, the allocation of local public goods under r makes at least one
district better oﬀ, and no district worse oﬀ, than the allocation under r .
According to Lockwood’s terminology, a system is unanimously preferred if and
only if it is Pareto-preferred. The following discussion conforms with this deﬁnition,
but does not depend on the adoption of a speciﬁc legislative rule. We can, however,
presume the adoption of the following rule according to this criterion:
Example 1. Let each of two representatives cast a vote in the central legislature for
their preferred ﬁscal regime [that which maximizes (6)]. If a representative has an
equal preference for two options, the vote of all such representatives is split among
them with equal shares. If a sole system receives the highest number of votes, then
it is selected; otherwise, the status quo holds. The system selected with the highest
number of votes is clearly preferred unanimously over the other system, according
to Deﬁnition 1.
3 Shortsighted Policy Choice
We ﬁrst examine policy choice under the alternative ﬁscal regimes, and subsequently
system selection in anticipation of it, when the representative has a short time
horizon (T = 1) and cares only about the immediate eﬀects of his policy choice on
citizens’ income in the next period. We extend this horizon in Section 4.
Decentralization. The period s representative in district i selects the best policy
τd
is against the other policy τd
js in anticipation of τd
i,s+1.8 A pair of simultaneous
best-policy choices therefore constitutes a Nash equilibrium in each period game.
8Due to our assumption of a continuum of citizens, the probability of any representative being
reelected is 0, so that his strategy is conﬁned to a choice of τr
is.
10Formally, from (5), the period s representative in district i maximizes
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It follows from (7) that the representative’s choice of τd
is is independent of the
level of the state variables {Δis,Δjs}. This logic also applies to the next-period
representative’s choice of τd
i,s+1. It will be chosen independently of {Δi,s+1,Δj,s+1}
and hence {τd
is,τd
js}. By regarding τd
js and τd
i,s+1 as constants and by substituting











The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of (9) is associated with the marginal cost
imposed on citizens through tax payment in the current period, and the second
term represents the marginal beneﬁt generated in the next period due to local
public good provision in the current period.9 Therefore, for any i ∈{ A,B} and s,








Note that given Δis, the choice of τd
is indirectly determines the level of gis ac-
cording to (8). Indeed, we deﬁned choice of τd
is, and not choice of gis, as the strategy
of the game. If gis were a control variable instead, choice of gis would aﬀect choice of
gi,s+1 in the next period, which would make it diﬃcult to search for an equilibrium.
Thus, our deﬁnition of the game strategy, as well as the logarithmic function in
(4), allows us to derive an equilibrium by utilizing the ﬁrst-order condition without
further speciﬁcation of the model.
9It is straightforward to show that the second-order condition holds as in successive maximiza-
tion problems.
11Centralization. Under the centralized ﬁscal regime, the national tax rate and the




gis = gjs = gs. This supposition describes the way in which a national tax scheme
implements interregional cost-sharing. Policy determination under a centralized
ﬁscal regime occurs after representatives who serve in the central legislature are
selected. The present approach to centralized decision-making is normative; a cen-
tral government must solve the problem of interregional beneﬁt spillovers through
the agreement of all concerned.10 From (5), anticipating τc
s+1, delegates from the
two districts reach an agreement that maximizes, by choice of τc


































s+1 as a constant and by substituting (12) into (11), we can derive



















10In addition to their analysis of cooperative decision-making by representatives in a central
legislature, Besley and Coate (2003) study non-cooperative representatives who seek to advance
only their own interests. However, they justify the cooperative approach on an empirical basis
(see p. 2622).
12Comparison between results (10) and (14) shows that for γ>0 the tax rate
under a centralized ﬁscal regime is higher than that under a decentralized ﬁscal
regime. In the presence of interregional beneﬁt spillovers, policy choice under a
centralized system attempts to internalize such spillovers, which leads to a higher
tax rate.
Comparison of Two Fiscal Regimes. For any time horizon T, logΔr

































2 and μ ≡
γ
(1+γ)(1−α(1−γ)). For a detailed derivation of (15), see
Appendix A.1. We have already given τd and τc in (10) and (14) for T = 1; for an




1 − α − αγ2
(1 + γ)2(1 − α(1 − γ))2 > 0, (16)
and μ takes its lowest value of 0 when γ = 0 and its highest value of 1
2 when γ =1 .
Conditions (15) and (16) suggest that under a decentralized ﬁscal regime, with a
higher extent of interregional beneﬁt spillovers, the steady-state level of income in a
district is inﬂuenced more by the neighboring district’s productivity through public
good provision by this district.
For any time horizon T, (6) and (15) can be used to express the net welfare of cit-























1 − τd − λ
c.(17)
The ﬁrst, second, and third terms on the right-hand side of (17) are associated with
the advantages of a centralized ﬁscal regime for public input provision, cost-sharing,
and the tax burden, respectively.
13Employing τr in (10) and (14) for each system, the result from calculation (17)
for a shortsighted policy choice (T = 1) is as follows:
W
c





1 − α(1 + γ)
log(1 + γ)+
1
















Using (18), decentralization and centralization can be compared as W c
i |T=1 
W d



















The left-hand side of (19) can take diﬀerent values between the two districts, but





















For the derivation of (20), see Appendix A.2. The results in (20) imply that given
μ, when the degree of interregional disparity is relatively small, a centralized ﬁscal
regime is less favorable for high-productivity district B as disparity increases: under
a national tax scheme, the high-productivity district is eﬀectively forced to transfer
part of its tax payment to the low-productivity district, and therefore it is more
reluctant to submit to it with greater disparity. Over a certain level of disparity,
which is lower with higher γ, district B beneﬁts more from centralization, since it
can support a low-productivity district’s public good provision that may generate
beneﬁt spillovers. On the other hand, for district A, a centralized ﬁscal regime
is more favorable as disparity is more distinct, since
xA
xB < 1 ≤ 1
μ − 1 for any μ.
Appendix A.3 also shows that the right-hand side of (19) is strictly decreasing in
γ. This suggests that a higher level of spillovers makes cooperative decision-making
more attractive to both districts.
14We can examine the case when a centralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously chosen
by utilizing (19). It is straightforward to show that district B’s level of the left-hand
side of (19) is equal to or lower than that of district A since μ ∈ [0, 1
2] (equality arises
only for γ = 1 and hence μ =
1
2). This means that high-productivity district B,a
transferor, desires decentralization more strongly than low-productivity district A,
a transferee. That is, when γ<1, if W c
B|T=1 ≥ W d
B|T=1, then W c
A|T=1 >W d
A|T=1,
so that a centralized system is unanimously preferred over a decentralized system
according to Deﬁnition 1. When γ = 1, a centralized system is unanimously pre-
ferred over a decentralized system if and only if W c
B|T=1 >W d


























i |T=1 − W d
i |T=1
 
, which corresponds to the left-hand side minus







A|γ=1) = log2 − 1
2α log 1+2αδ
1+αδ − 1−2α
2α λc ≥ 0. Note that
this condition is likely to hold with a lower discount factor δ (implying that citizens
and representatives are concerned about the current cost rather than the future ben-




is investigated in Section 4, where decentralization may occur even if the beneﬁt
from a local public good spills over completely). As demonstrated below, under
this condition we can ﬁnd a single value of γ ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes ρ1
B = 0 for any
choice of
xB


















































































In Figure 1 the thin down-slope curve indicates the magnitude of ξ(γ) ≡
1
μ(γ) −1
on the horizontal axis. Below this curve,
xB
xA < 1




























as a single-peaked curve. The peak is on the down-slope
curve at
xB




B|γ=1 ≥ 0, 0 < ˆ γ1
B < 1 for any
xB
xA ∈ (1,∞).
















favor decentralization, and those
above the curve favor centralization. According to our discussion, if the combination






on or above the curve, then a centralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred.
These results establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose T = 1 (shortsighted policy choice). Let Assumptions 1 and























B ∈ (0,1), means that citizens in district B are indiﬀerent








￿  0 for
xB
xA  ˇ x. Then a centralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously













According to Proposition 1, the high degree of beneﬁt spillovers is linked to
unanimous preference for a centralized ﬁscal regime. It also suggests that central-
ization is more likely under suﬃciently small and suﬃciently large values of disparity
16measure
xB
xA. When the productivity is similar, so that
xB
xA is small, high-productivity
district B is more reluctant to transfer a portion of its income to low-productivity
district A as the disparity increases. If the disparity is so serious that it exceeds the
threshold, however, ﬁnancially supporting the neighbor’s local public good provi-
sion is beneﬁcial to district B, even with the lower degree of spillovers. The merit
of cost-sharing inherent to the centralized ﬁscal regime is dominant.
Corollary 1. For any
xB






is strictly increasing with respect to
each of λc and δ, while ˇ x is strictly decreasing with respect to each of λc and δ.
Proof of Corollary 1. See Appendix A.4.
Corollary 1 describes that the single-peaked curve in Figure 1 shifts upward with
increasing conﬂict by losing autonomy and increasing discount factor, resulting in
likely decentralization in spite of the higher degree of beneﬁt spillovers. When the
discount factor is so high that policy-makers take greater account of the beneﬁt of
local public good provision rather than its cost, the divergence in tax burden under
the two systems is greater, and a decentralized system is more favored. Thus, the
expected higher tax rate that all districts will agree on to solve the problem of
positive externalities may ironically hinder cooperative solution, as well as the cost
of conﬂict.
Remark 1. In our model, interregional cost-sharing and internalization of beneﬁt
spillovers can be achieved by delegating power to an institution overseeing interre-
gional coordination, a central government. Without its power to enforce cooperative
solutions, each district would consequently behave selﬁshly and a Nash equilibrium
(a tax rate under a decentralized ﬁscal regime) would arise. Let us interpret each
district as a nation and the central government as an international institution. In
this case, Proposition 1 demonstrates the circumstances under which an interna-
tional institution may be established to achieve eﬃcient allocation of global public
17goods.












decentralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred over a centralized ﬁscal regime,
or no ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred. Bolton and Roland (1997) suppose that
when at least one region favors decentralization, secession occurs. If we complied
with their deﬁnition, Proposition 1 could give us a necessary and suﬃcient condition







We can examine the unanimous choice of a decentralized ﬁscal regime in a
similar manner. When γ>0, if W d
A|T=1 ≥ W c
A|T=1, then W d
B|T=1 >W c
B|T=1,s o
that a decentralized system is unanimously preferred over a centralized system.
When γ = 1, a decentralized system is unanimously preferred over a centralized
system if and only if W d
A|T=1 >Wc
A|T=1.























∈ (1,∞) × [0,1]. This implies that if we have
xB
xA ∈ (1,∞) that
satisﬁes ρ1
A = 0 for a given γ, it should be single-valued. We represent this value of
xB
xA by the function ˆ X1
A = ˆ X1
A(γ). For example, we examine the sign of ρ1
A for γ =0 .
Then ρ1
A|γ=0  0 for
xB
xA  ˆ X1
A(0) = e
1−α
α λc+log2 − 1, so that values of the disparity
measure higher (lower) than ˆ X1
A(0) are associated with centralization (decentraliza-



















These two facts suggest that we can plot a frontier ˆ X1









). Figure 2 displays one example of the curve ˆ X1
A(γ) and dis-
trict A’s preference relations for two ﬁscal regimes, although we cannot certify that
ˆ X1
A is monotonically decreasing in γ for any set of {α,δ,λc}.
Proposition 2. Suppose T = 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Suppose that a
18set of parameters {α,δ,λc} satisﬁes log2− 1
2α log 1+2αδ
1+αδ − 1−2α
2α λc ≥ 0. Then we can
deﬁne the continuously diﬀerentiable function ˆ X1









on which ˆ X1
A(0) = e
1−α














means that citizens in district A are indiﬀerent to the choice between
the two ﬁscal regimes. Then a decentralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred







xA ≤ ˆ X1
A(γ).
Continuous diﬀerentiability of function ˆ X1




xA and γ. According to Proposition 2, a pair of a lower
value of the disparity measure and a lower value of the degree of beneﬁt spillovers
is likely linked to unanimous preference for a decentralized ﬁscal regime, because
both districts lose less by decentralization. If the disparity measure
xB
xA is large,
divergence between the level of a public good for district A under centralization
and decentralization is also large, and it will gain more from centralization even if
the tax rate rises. If the degree of beneﬁt spillovers γ is large, it beneﬁts district B
to support district A ﬁnancially.
The following corollary shows the positive relationship between potential friction
due to centralized governance and agreement on decentralization.
Corollary 2. ˆ X1








are strictly increasing with respect to λc.
Furthermore, limλc→0 ˆ X1









Proof of Corollary 2. See Appendix A.5.
4 General Solutions for Policy Choice
A local public good in a district also has indirect eﬀects on the income of future
citizens in this district by inﬂuencing the dynamic transition of the state variables.
Given {Δis,Δjs}, and hence given tax bases {yis,y js}, the choice of τr
is determines
19the public good level of district i in period s. With interregional beneﬁt spillovers,
this inﬂuences the period s + 1 state variables {Δi,s+1,Δj,s+1}, and therefore the
period s + 1 tax bases in both districts {yi,s+1,y j,s+1}, which in turn aﬀect the
period s + 1 local public good levels. These will subsequently inﬂuence the period
s + 2 state variables and the tax bases of both districts, and so on. Let us refer to
these spillovers from the district i public good in period s to the district i income in
period s + k,2≤ k<∞,a sintergenerational beneﬁt spillovers.11 A representative
with time horizon T will count these eﬀects through period s + T.
Figure 3 describes how the choice of τr
is contributes to the period utility of each
district. Due to the logarithm in the period utility function (4), given {Δis,Δjs}
and hence {yis,y js}, the choice of τr
is, immediately aﬀecting the period s utility
of district i by log(1 − τr
is), also inﬂuences the period s + 1 utility of citizens in
district i by αlogτr
is, whereas it inﬂuences the period s + 1 utility of citizens in
district j by αγ logτr
is. In period s + 2, it contributes to the utility of districts i
and j by (α2 +( αγ)2)logτr
is and 2α(αγ)logτr
is, respectively. Under a decentralized
ﬁscal regime, a district i representative at the policy decision stage in period s
considers its eﬀects on ui,s+k up to k = T. Under a centralized ﬁscal regime, its
whole eﬀects on ui,s+k and uj,s+k are counted. A stream of these future eﬀects on
ui,s+k or ui,s+k + uj,s+k is demonstrated in Appendix A.6. To derive the optimal
policy choice under each regime, the balance between the tax burden in the current
period and discounted future beneﬁts should be solved.
Decentralization. Given {Δis,Δjs}, against the other representative’s policy
choice and in anticipation of future policy decisions in both districts, the period
s representative in district i chooses τd
is to maximize V T
is in (5) subject to (8). The
11We use the term “intergenerational” to describe the relations permitting generations that did
not pay the tax price to beneﬁt from local public goods supplied by preceding generations. A
comment by Yukihiro Nishimura on an earlier version of this paper inspired this treatment of
intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers.
20eﬀect of τd
is on ui,s+k,1≤ k ≤ T, is given by:





For derivation of (23), see Appendix A.6. Then, from (23), by taking {τd
i,s+k,τd
j,s+k−1}1≤k≤T























(α + αγ)δ(1 − (α + αγ)TδT)
1 − (α + αγ)δ
+
(α − αγ)δ(1 − (α − αγ)TδT)
1 − (α − αγ)δ
 
.(25)







It follows immediately from (25), (26), and Assumption 1 that a tax rate chosen
by a policy-maker with longer sight is higher, since it internalizes intergenerational
beneﬁt spillovers into the farther future.
Centralization. Given {Δis,Δjs}, the period s delegates from both districts co-
operate so as to maximize V T
is + V T
js by the choice of τc
s = τc
is = τc
js subject to (12).
The eﬀect of τc





Refer to Appendix A.6 for the derivation of (27). Then, by regarding {τc
s+k}1≤k≤T



















(α + αγ)δ(1 − (α + αγ)TδT)
1 − (α + αγ)δ
. (29)







Note again that τc in (30) is greater with higher T.
Comparison of Two Fiscal Regimes. It is diﬃcult to derive analytical solutions
for the choice of ﬁscal regime for any T from (25), (26), (29), and (30) without
further speciﬁcation. Therefore, we focus on the case with full beneﬁt spillovers
(γ = 1). The purpose of the analysis is to investigate how interregional beneﬁt
spillovers, which are completely internalized under a centralized ﬁscal regime, can be
internalized even under a decentralized system by a policy-maker who can consider
intergenerational spillover eﬀects.
If γ = 1, from (17), decentralization and centralization are compared as W c
i |γ=1 
W d



































Equations (32) and (33) are derived from (25), (26), (29), and (30). The left-hand
side of (31) suggests that with full beneﬁt spillovers, disagreement between districts
with diverse productivity does not arise: they favor the same system. It follows
from (20) that with γ = 1 and hence μ = 1
2, log x √xixj is strictly increasing in
xB
xA,





1−τd in the right-hand side of (31). From (32) and (33), it is
straightforward to show that under Assumption 1, as T increases, both τc
τd and 1−τc
1−τd
22decrease. This suggests that a politician’s farsightedness in policy decision-making
may compensate for the deﬁciencies of decentralization to a certain extent.
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then W c
i |γ=1 − W d
i |γ=1 is strictly de-
creasing with respect to T.
Proof of Lemma 1. See Appendix A.7.
From (17), we can compute ρT








coincides with the left-hand side minus the right-hand side of (31) and is common
for any i. Proposition 1 supposed that the environment represented by {α,δ,λc}
satisﬁes lim xB
xA
→1 ρ1|γ=1 = log2 − 1
2α log 1+2αδ
1+αδ − 1−2α
2α λc ≥ 0. Then, due to the
monotonic increase of log
x √xixj with regard to
xB
xA for γ =1 ,ρ1|γ=1 > 0 for any
xB
xA ∈ (1,∞), which implies that with full beneﬁt spillovers, a centralized ﬁscal
regime is unanimously preferred over a decentralized ﬁscal regime for any degree of
disparity measure. Now suppose that lim xB
xA
→1 ρ1|γ=1 < 0: this condition is likely
with a higher δ and a higher λc. Then we have a threshold ˜ X1 ∈ (1,∞) such that
ρ1|γ=1  0 for
xB
xA  ˜ X1. Furthermore, according to Lemma 1, we can also ﬁnd a
threshold ˜ XT ∈ (1,∞) for T>1.







2α λc < 0. For any time horizon T ∈ [1,∞),
we have ˜ XT ∈ (1,∞) such that: with complete interregional spillovers (γ = 1), a
decentralized ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred over a centralized ﬁscal regime
if
xB
xA ∈ (1, ˜ XT); no system is preferred unanimously if
xB
xA = ˜ XT; and a centralized
ﬁscal regime is unanimously preferred over a decentralized ﬁscal regime if
xB
xA ∈
( ˜ XT,∞). Then ˜ XT < ˜ XT+1.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 3, which has two messages. One is that central-
ization is more likely selected under a great disparity. Because the beneﬁt produced
23by the neighbor’s public good completely spills over, the high-productivity district
willingly supports the low-productivity district to realize uniform local public good
allocation, in spite of the unequal tax burden. The second is that if policy-makers
can make decisions that consider the welfare of successive generations, a decentral-
ized ﬁscal regime stands a better chance of being adopted. Even if each policy-maker
is solely interested in the welfare in his district under a decentralized system, he
will consider the secondary eﬀect of his choice on the neighboring district, since its
increased income will beneﬁt his district at later intervals. Farsighted policy choice,
which internalizes intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers through the far future, thus
reduces the usual eﬃciency loss due to decentralization. In other words, when
each policy-maker chooses a policy by considering only its immediate eﬀects, an
institution to promote cooperation among districts will be established.
Corollary 3. ˜ XT is strictly increasing with respect to λc.
Proof of Corollary 3. See Appendix A.8.
Corollary 3 has the same implication as Corollaries 1 and 2: suppression of
conﬂict induced by centralized governance is a force that drives decentralization.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a model by which the relative merits of decentralization
and centralization can be evaluated. A centralized ﬁscal regime can implement
cost-sharing between districts with diverse productivity levels, and further allows
internalization of interregional beneﬁt spillovers from the provision of local public
goods. The centralized ﬁscal regime is, however, assumed to be inferior, in that citi-
zens suﬀer on losing autonomy. The key features of this model are its incorporation
of interregional dependencies and dynamic linkages. In each period, representatives
decide on a proportional income tax rate; this decision determines the level of a local
24public good and aﬀects future income levels in both districts, which in turn aﬀect
future local public good levels. The decisions made by representatives also depend
on the extent to which they take into account intergenerational beneﬁt spillovers
from a local public good.
A key ﬁnding of this paper is that a decentralized (centralized) ﬁscal regime is
more likely to be unanimously preferred when the interregional disparity in pro-
ductivity is small (large) and the extent of interregional beneﬁt spillovers is low
(high). It was also found that even with full interregional spillovers, decentraliza-
tion is more likely to be promoted when policy-makers have suﬃcient foresight and
consider future generations in making their decisions. Farsighted policy-makers al-
low for long-term beneﬁts due to the increased income of other districts even under
a decentralized system, and this eﬀect suppresses the usual welfare loss caused by
decentralization.
This work has supposed that delegates cooperate in a central legislature to
maximize the welfare of the entire population. Under this supposition, results have
been derived showing that as interregional disparity increases, centralized decision-
making is more likely to be preferred. Introduction of strategic behavior by delegates
into the model could spawn a deeper examination of the problem.
A Appendix
A.1 General Solutions for logΔis
Decentralization. From (1), (2), and (8), using τd
is = τd in (10) (or (26)), the






















































From (A1), (A2), and Assumption 1, the steady-state levels of logΔis and logΔjs
under a decentralized ﬁscal regime, logΔd
i and logΔd










(1 − α)2 − (αγ)2
⎡
⎣
(1 − α)logωi + αγ logωj
(1 − α)logωj + αγ logωi
⎤
⎦. (A3)
Result (A3) is arranged as the upper part of (15). Since the eigenvalues associated
with (A1) are α(1 + γ) and α(1 − γ), general solutions are given by:
logΔis = φ1(α(1 + γ))




logΔjs = φ1(α(1 + γ))



























Centralization. It follows from Assumption 2 that Δis =Δ js =Δ s, s ≥ 0, since
this scheme provides a uniform level of local public goods across districts. From
(1), (2), and (12), using τc
s = τc in (14) (or (30)), the diﬀerence equation on logΔs
is given by:
logΔs+1 = α(1 + γ)log(τ
cx)+α(1 + γ)logΔs. (A4)





1 − α(1 + γ)
log(τ
cx). (A5)
Result (A5) can be represented as the lower part of (15). Thus, the general solution
is:



















































































< 0 for any
xi
xj. These results are summarized in (20).
A.3 Monotonicity of the RHS of (19)





α(1+γ) λc. This represents the



















c < 0. (A8)
Thus, the RHS of (19) strictly decreases in γ.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
According to Proposition 1, given
xB
xA, we have a single value of γ,ˆ γ1
B > 0, with
which equality holds in (19) for B. Then the RHS of (19) exceeds its LHS for a
higher value of λc. To recover equality, a higher value of γ is needed, since the LHS
of (19) for B strictly increases in γ, and the RHS of (19) strictly decreases in γ,a s
shown in (A8).
We can examine the relation between δ and ˆ γ1
B in the same manner. Recall that






(1 + γ)(1 + α(1 + γ)δ)(1 + αδ)
> 0, (A9)
27and hence the RHS of (19) exceeds its LHS for a higher value of δ. To recover
equality, a higher value of γ is needed for the same reasoning.








A.5 Proof of Corollary 2
The assertion for ˆ X1
A(0) is immediately derived using ˆ X1
A(0) = e
1−α
α λc+log2 − 1 and
Assumption 1.
For the monotonicity of limxB
xA
→1 ˆ γ1





















where ψ represents the RHS of (19). From the deﬁnition of ˆ γ1
B, given λc, the































































since μ(·) is bounded. It follows from (A12) that limxB
xA
→1 ˆ γ1
B is implicitly given by
ψ (γ,λc) = 0. Suppose that it holds for a given value of λc. Then ψ(γ,λc) > 0 with
a higher value of λc, and to recover equality we need a higher value of γ, since ψ
















B = 0 is thus proved.
28A.6 Future Eﬀects of Policy Choice
We calculate the eﬀects of a choice of τr
is on ui,s+k and uj,s+k. The discussion does
not rely on an assumption of τc
is = τc
js. Let β ≡ αγ and let κs+k =( α + β)k. Then
κs+k logτr
is represents the total contribution of a policy choice τr
is to the sum of the
period s + k utility for both districts, ui,s+k + uj,s+k. Let the beneﬁt spilling from
τr
is to uj,s+k be denoted by χs+k logτr
is. Then χs+k evolves according to
χs+k+1 = αχs+k + β(κs+k − χs+k)
=( α − β)χs+k + β(α + β)
k. (A14)
From (A14), the general solution for χs+k is given by:
χs+k =
(α + β)k − (α − β)k
2
. (A15)
From (A15), when choosing τd








is, 1 ≤ k ≤ T, (A16)
whereas in setting τc
is he considers the stream
κs+k logτ
c
is =( α + β)
k logτ
c
is, 1 ≤ k ≤ T. (A17)
A.7 Proof of Lemma 1
We can derive from (17) that
W
c



















αδ(1−(2αδ)T ). Then, from Assumption 1, φ strictly decreases in T. Fur-
thermore, the sign of the partial derivative of τc

















τd strictly decreases in T. Also, using (33) we can prove that 1−τc
1−τd strictly
decreases in T in the same manner. It is thus demonstrated that W c
i |γ=1 −W d
i |γ=1
in (A18) is strictly decreasing with regard to T.
29A.8 Proof of Corollary 3
Let equality hold in (31). The RHS exceeds the LHS for a higher value of λc.
To recover equality a higher value of
xB
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Preference Relations of High-Productivity District B
over Two Fiscal Regimes (T =1 )
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36Figure 4.
Preference Relations of Districts A and B
over Two Fiscal Regimes (γ =1 )
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